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Varieties of Capitalism, Varieties of Vulnerabilities: 
Financial Crisis and its Impact on Welfare States in 
Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of 
Independent States 
Jan Drahokoupil and Martin Myant ∗ 
Abstract: »Varianten des Kapitalismus – Varianten von Vulnerabilität. Die 
Finanzkrise und ihre Auswirkungen auf die Wohlfahrtsstaatsregime in Osteu-
ropa und der Gemeinschaft Unabhängiger Staaten«. This paper investigates 
the implications of the 2008 financial crisis on welfare states and the capitalist 
diversity in the post-communist world, including Eastern Europe and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States. It analyzes three political-economic va-
rieties in the region: those of capitalism, welfare, and vulnerabilities to the cri-
sis. The three varieties are linked, but there is also a considerable variation 
given the importance of political and policy factors. Economic growth models 
created different political and economic constraints on policies of adjustment 
to the crisis. In particular, currency substitution was associated with strong po-
litical preferences for defending exchange rates, with adjustment through re-
ductions in public spending and wages. A variety of welfare models was asso-
ciated with different political constituencies for welfare provision. The 
interplay of these constraints and political factors together with intervention of 
international institutions shapes the nature of welfare state adjustments. Early 
developments also indicate some unexpected outcomes. 
Keywords: financial crisis; welfare state; varieties of capitalism; Eastern 
Europe; Russia; Commonwealth of Independent States  
Introduction 
This contribution analyzes the implication of the global financial crisis of 2008 
for Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).1 It is 
concerned with the impact of economic shocks on the capitalist variety in the 
region. In particular, it analyzes the implications of the crisis for public spend-
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ing and the nature of social protection. Three points will be pursued to under-
stand the impact of the crisis. First, the financial crisis had different implica-
tions in different contexts. The capitalist variety in the region also involved 
different structures of vulnerabilities to external shocks. What is more, the 
economic strategies were coupled with different welfare models. There were 
thus important differences in what was at stake in terms of institutions of social 
protection.  
Second, economic growth models created different political and economic 
constraints on policies of adjustment to the crisis. In particular, currency substi-
tution was associated with strong political preferences for defending (overval-
ued) exchange rates, with adjustment through reductions in public spending 
and wages. In turn, a variety of social models was associated with different 
political constituencies for welfare provision. These are likely to shape the 
nature of welfare state adjustments. 
Third, external actors played an important role. Most notably, the IMF, and 
in the CIS context also Russia, were an important source of emergency fund-
ing. The IMF’s loan conditionalities imposed hard constraints on countries with 
liquidity problems. However, the nature and implications of the conditionalities 
differed, depending on the context of individual welfare state models. 
The argument is structured as follows. After discussing existing conceptu-
alization of the capitalist variety in the region, the paper identifies six models 
of growth and international integration set against the internal features that 
were their preconditions. The third section investigates the variety of welfare 
models as coupled with the capitalist variety. Finally, the impacts of the crisis 
are analyzed along a four stage framework. In this context, the implications of 
IMF conditionalities are discussed. The conclusion pulls threads together and 
assesses the prospects. 
Beyond ‘varieties of capitalism’ 
The economic recovery of the late nineties and early 2000s saw a variety of 
growth models, with differences in the structure and organization of the econ-
omy and in the mode of international integration. Table 1 provides an overview 
of the international positions of individual economies in 2006, just before the 
financial crisis started to change the picture. All of the countries experienced 
problems with achieving external balance, with current account deficits reach-
ing alarming levels in the Baltic States, South-Eastern Europe and a number of 
poorer countries in the CIS, reflecting their inability to develop competitive 
export activities to balance imports as well as a failure to control consumption 
and spending levels. In general, however, these imbalances were not linked to 
public spending deficits as was the case for crises in South America. The ap-
proach taken here characterizes the capitalist variety in the region by analyzing 
the different modes of growth and nature of international integration, with 
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internal features of individual countries as their preconditions (Myant and 
Drahokoupil 2010). It draws on recent advances in the literature on ‘varieties of 
capitalism’ in transition economies, yet differs in several respects. 
As far as the ‘dependent variable’ problem is concerned, the ‘varieties of 
capitalism’ (VoC) framework developed for the analysis of the most developed 
market economies (Hall and Soskice 2001) seeks to explain the development 
and persistence of competitiveness in different branches of economic activity. 
That remains the starting point: export structures in transition economies show 
structured differences in terms of their export specialization. However, this 
needs to be supplemented with a broader view of the modes of growth and 
international integration. Indeed, attempts to apply the VoC framework in the 
post-communist context demonstrated that one of the key features of transition 
economies, differences in the nature of integration into international economic 
flow beyond differences in export structures, remained exogenous to the 
framework (for an overview, see Drahokoupil 2009)2. The forms of recovery 
can be presented as different solutions to the problem of financing the persis-
tent current account deficits. The surge in natural-resource prices resolved the 
problem in countries with natural-resource endowments, but growth models in 
other countries were dependent on different forms of capital inflows. The sali-
ence of these differences became apparent in the aftermath of the crisis. 
The ‘independent variables’ in the Hall and Soskice framework are what can 
be called ‘specific comparative institutional advantages’. These include mutu-
ally reinforcing institutional forms that affect strategic interaction of actors 
within a political economy, allowing companies to construct their core compe-
tencies. These include means of raising investments, the forms of corporate 
governance, the scope of cooperation between firms, and types of employment 
relationships. Others have expanded the framework to include the role of the 
state in leading economic development (e.g. Schmidt 2002; Amable 2003; 
Boyer 2005). The framework offers a number of indicators that can be fol-
lowed in transition economies; and comparisons have been made on this basis 
(e.g. Feldmann 2006; Knell and Srholec 2007; Mykhnenko 2007; Buchen 
2007). However, such specific institutional advantages are not the key factors 
in distinguishing the kinds of capitalism in transition economies. 
 
 
                                                             
2  A similar critique of the ‘Varieties of Framework’ can also be made for its utility in the 
context of advanced capitalist states (e.g. Pontusson 2005; Panitch and Gindin 2005); a 
point that became particularly relevant in the context of the global financial crisis. 
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In fact, more ‘generic institutional advantages’ proved to be much more im-
portant in the context of transition economies. These include state capacity, the 
rule of law, a functioning system of corporate governance, a stable financial 
system, clarity of ownership relations, and a separation of politics and business. 
These issues were either taken for granted or given little attention in the VoC 
literature, but they proved to be crucial in the evolution of capitalist relations in 
the CIS. What is more, these institutional advantages arguably played a major 
role in the path-shaping processes of the early 1990s, contributing to the differ-
ences among East European countries (Greskovits 2005). 
The internal preconditions shaping the capitalist variety also included (in-
herited) economic structures and their levels. These ‘structural comparative 
advantages’ played an important role, particularly in the countries with similar 
‘generic institutional advantages’, as was the case in Eastern Europe. Geo-
graphical location and political ‘traditions’ are linked to all of these points. 
Specific policies did matter at some points, particularly in the late nineties 
when they could make a difference in terms of retaining the structural and 
institutional advantages. However, choices concerning the pace of liberaliza-
tion and stabilization measures as well as the speed of privatization appeared to 
have less an impact by the late 1990s. Other important policy issues included 
the steps taken to attract FDI and policies towards the financial sector. 
Varieties 1: Modes of growth and international integration 
The above considerations lead to the identification of six modes of growth and 
international integration, set against the internal features of individual countries 
that were their preconditions. These do not constitute six forms of ‘varieties of 
capitalism’: every country relied on more than one mode of growth. However, 
there are differences in the weights of the different forms, and rough country 
groupings can be identified. 
First, the most secure form of international integration, offering the highest 
incomes, was the export of high-value products manufactured in branches of 
large multinational companies into western Europe. The dominance of MNCs 
in determining economic success has justified Nölke and Vliegenthart (2009) to 
propose a ‘dependent market economies’ model into the ‘Varieties of Capital-
ism’ framework, with intrafirm hierarchies within transnational enterprises 
constituting a distinctive coordination mechanism (cf. King 2007). The promi-
nence of foreign ownership means that themes of enterprise finance or corpo-
rate governance, or the ‘specific institutional advantages’, are of much less 
relevance and need not be well developed in the transition economy: those 
issues are resolved by the MNCs in their home bases. 
The MNCs were attracted to countries with which they had been in contact 
in the past, which had heritages of reasonably modern industry, good physical 
infrastructures and links to western Europe. Policies could influence such 
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‘structural advantages’ to the extent that they helped maintain industrial bases 
in the sectors that attracted investors seeking acquisitions (cf. Greskovits 2005, 
117-119; Kurth 1979, 3-4). Political stability was important to companies un-
dertaking long-term investment and the likelihood of EU accession served as a 
useful stamp of approval.  
The MNCs needed a secure legal and business environment, giving confi-
dence that contracts would be honoured. Specific policies mattered and MNCs 
were sought out by governments, offering help with infrastructure develop-
ment, subsidies and other concessions. There therefore had to be a stable state 
and also one with an agenda for supporting this form of economic develop-
ment. MNCs were attracted first to the Visegrad Four countries, giving those 
countries further ‘structural advantages’ that became increasingly permanent. 
The second form is integration through exports in complex sectors without 
reliance on FDI. This is a sort of residual category, with only two significant 
partial exceptions to setting integration through MNCs as absolute require-
ments for integration through exports of machinery-complex products. In the 
CIS, Belarus was able to export vehicles on the basis of an ‘order state’ (Iwa-
saki 2004), with state ownership of key enterprises and state direction of banks’ 
lending policies.  
However, these products were able to compete only in less demanding mar-
kets and it remains to be seen whether that model will prove to be more than 
transient. In Eastern Europe, only Slovenia was able to take advantage of its 
inherited industrial structure to develop an export economy that is less reliant 
on FDI than is common in the region. 
The third form is integration through exports in simple manufacturing – 
such as garments, footwear and simpler components – typically with very pre-
cise specifications as to what was required, and in some cases direct invest-
ment. There also had to be an adequate transport and communications infra-
structure, but required skill levels were low – all product development took 
place in a richer country – so that low labour costs were a key attraction. The 
inherited industrial structure was also important, as it typically provided the 
productive capacity and labour force that could be adapted quickly to satisfy 
new orders. Issues of corporate governance or privatisation policies were of 
little significance to the foreign company, but the MNC did require a suffi-
ciently secure legal framework to ensure that contracts would be honoured. 
This form of integration was important in the Visegrad Four in the early 1990s 
and in Southern and Eastern Europe and the Baltic States in later years. It also 
spread to lower income countries, including Central Asian Republics, but on a 
very small scale. 
Fourth, integration through commodity exports played some role across 
many more countries, but was most important for the oil-exporting countries 
and for Ukraine, a steel-exporter. Exporting raw materials and semi-manu-
factures required a less sophisticated business environment. This was compati-
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ble with lower levels of state capacity and with institutional environments that 
did not provide a basis for secure links between enterprises, and even less for 
the development of new and innovative firms. 
The fifth mode of integration is the ‘financialized’ growth in which foreign 
borrowing supports private sector activity. Financial inflows thus fuel domestic 
consumption, stimulating imports and covering the deficits on many countries’ 
current accounts. This was never the only form of integration, but it became 
important as a driver for economic development in the years up to 2008 as to 
warrant specific attention. 
Table 2: Diversity of current account financing 
Financial account, total Financial account without FDI 
  2002 2006 2007 2002 2006 2007 
Czech Rep 14.1 3.0 2.8 3.1 0.1 -1.7 
Hungary 3.9 10.7 7.3 -0.2 9.7 3.9 
Poland 3.6 3.8 9.4 1.7 0.7 5.1 
Slovakia 15.1 1.7 8.4 3.3 -3.8 4.8 
Slovenia 9.1 -0.3 5.7 2.2 0.3 5.9 
Bulgaria 22.5 28.1 47.1 16.9 4.2 18.2 
Estonia 10.3 18.1 16.7 8.2 14.0 11.4 
Latvia 7.4 30.8 24.6 4.7 23.3 17.9 
Lithuania 7.4 15.5 16.1 2.5 10.3 12.5 
Romania 8.9 15.4 17.7 6.4 6.5 11.8 
Albania 4.8 5.8 6.8 1.8 2.3 2.6 
Bosnia & Herzegovina 8.9 10.1 14.4 4.6 4.3 0.6 
Croatia 10.3 13.1 11.2 8.2 6.6 3.2 
Macedonia 6.6 6.8 6.0 3.8 0.2 1.9 
Serbia   18.8   21.1 
Belarus 5.2 4.6 11.6 2.1 3.6 7.7 
Kazakhstan 5.5 20.0 8.0 -3.3 11.7 0.4 
Russia 0.6 0.3 7.4 0.8 -0.4 6.7 
Ukraine -2.5 3.6 10.7 -4.2 -1.7 4.2 
Armenia 6.2 6.8 10.7 1.5 -0.2 3.3 
Georgia 0.4 17.3 21.6 -4.2 3.5 5.3 
Kyrgyzstan 6.9 11.9 9.3 6.6 5.5 3.8 
Moldova 1.2 10.5 22.2 -3.8 3.2 11.2 
Tajikistan 6.0 9.8 21.9 3.0 -2.2 12.2 
Source: calculated from IMF financial statistics. 
 
The most basic indicator for financialized growth is the surplus on the fi-
nancial account excluding the contribution of FDI. Table 2 shows the break-
down by countries. The group of financialized economies spreads across geo-
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graphical areas and is not obviously linked to export structures, economic lev-
els or previous transformation strategies. This includes Hungary, Belarus, 
Ukraine and Kazakhstan.  
A number of low income countries also depended significantly on financial 
inflows, including Armenia, Georgia, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, but much of 
this came in the form of official aid with rather different implications for eco-
nomic development. Russia was unique among countries with a significant 
financial inflow, as it also achieved substantial current account surpluses, 
meaning that it was building up reserves at the same time. 
Prerequisites for financialized growth include both internal and external 
conditions, covering the availability of liquidity, bankers’ perceptions of the 
countries concerned, activities to which they could give loans and an internal 
environment that meant the domestic economy could not provide enough credit 
without inflows from outside. Inflows clearly escalated into Baltic Republics 
and South-East European countries around the time of EU accession. None of 
these countries saw dangers in the process and governments actively encour-
aged the inflow. Thus, fixed exchange rates guaranteeing macro-economic 
restriction and real exchange rate appreciation, capital account liberalization, 
and light-to-no-touch regulation of lending, and low-to-zero taxation on capital 
gains (including housing market speculation) were associated with financial-
ized development. 
Hungary was somewhat exceptional in that part of the inflow financed state 
budget deficits. Portions also went to businesses and households (see Table 3). 
The government, in fact, originally encouraged mortgages, but the subsidies 
were cut in 2003 (Rózsavölgyi and Kovács 2005). At that point, the middle-
class demand for low-interest credit was satisfied by foreign-currency mort-
gages offered by transnational banks (Bohle 2009). This latter phenomenon 
was new to the 2000s, with much of the credit being applied for house pur-
chases, in comparison to the 1990s in which credit had gone overwhelmingly to 
enterprises. 
Finally, the sixth form of international integration is dependence on remit-
tances, aid and borrowing from IFIs to compensate for often substantial trade 
deficits. 
These were common methods for the lowest income countries. The enter-
prise sphere failed to provide competitive exports and also to compete with 
imports. 
Integration into the world economy took place, therefore, in the form of citi-
zens working in other countries, often Russia and in some cases central or 
western Europe, and sending earnings home. 
Finally, the sixth form of international integration is dependence on remit-
tances, aid and borrowing from IFIs to compensate for often substantial trade 
deficits. 
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These were common methods for the lowest income countries. The enter-
prise sphere failed to provide competitive exports and also to compete with 
imports. 
Integration into the world economy took place, therefore, in the form of citi-
zens working in other countries, often Russia and in some cases central or 
western Europe, and sending earnings home. 
Table 3: Domestic credit 
Domestic Credit 
(percentage of GDP) 
Loan/ 
Deposit 
Ratio 
Domestic 
Credit to 
Households 
(percentage of 
GDP) 
… of that 
mortgages 
 2000 2007 2008 Q1 2009 2002 2007e 2002 2007e 
Estonia  34.9 95.1 90.4 2.1 10.6 43.3 51.9 87.1 
Latvia  23.3 94.8 86 2.8 7.3 42.7 56.2 78.9 
Lithuania  15.2 60.2 55.7 2 2.4 24.4 79.2 70.5 
Czech Rep  49.4 52.9 51.1 0.8 7.3 20 41.1 62.5 
Hungary  53.5 74.4 72.9 1.4 7.4 21.7 55.4 75.6 
Poland  34.4 46.6 46 1.1 9.4 20 25.5 49.5 
Slovakia  56.6 51.6 48.2  5.5 16.3 18.2 27.6 
Slovenia  8.9 79 -  10.5 19.2 19 32.3 
Bulgaria  17.8 59.2 53.4 1.3 3.7 23 - 45.2 
Romania  14 35.7 31.9 1.3 - 17.7 - 7.9 
Croatia  47.2 82.9 76.6 1.1 23.8 41.1 28.6 39.9 
Russia  24.7 25.2 19.5 1.3 1 9 - 21.1 
Belarus  19.2 27.2 21.6 1.5* 1.8 8.3 88.9 55.4 
Ukraine  37.9 48.7 44.4 2 1.6 22.5 88.9 28.9 
Armenia  11.5 12.1 11.2  1.5 6.4 - 26.6 
Azerbaijan  9.6 18.2 10.7  1.4 5.8 - 12.1 
Georgia  21.6 31.6 29.6  3 8.8 16.7 29.5 
Moldova  25.2 40.2 36.3  0.5 5.5 180 72.7 
Kazakhstan  12.3 41 30.1 1.7 1.6 20.3 12.5 20.2 
Kyrgyzstan  12.2 14.2 -  0.3 3.3  -  72.7 
*2007 data, Reiffeisen Research. 
Source: IMF (2008b); Moody’s (2008); author’s calculations; (a) Data are for first quarter of 
2008. 
Note: Domestic credit to households is the ratio of outstanding bank credit to households, at 
end-of-year, to GDP; mortgage lending is the ratio of mortgage lending to households, at end-
of-year, to GDP; asset share of foreign-owned banks is the share of total bank sector assets in 
banks with foreign ownership exceeding 50 percent, end-of-year. 
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Varieties 2: Worlds of welfare 
The capitalist variety outlined above was coupled with different welfare-state 
regimes. However, as the ‘specific institutional advantages’ including also 
institutions of social protection played a relatively minor role, the link between 
the welfare regimes and the internal preconditions constituting the growth 
regimes is less direct than implied in the VoC framework (cf. Ebbinghaus and 
Manow 2001). 
The integration through complex-sectors is favourable to protective institu-
tions as it provides higher income and involves specialization in activities that 
are less sensitive to labour costs. However, domestic institutions, such as those 
regulating industrial relations and labour markets, made little difference for 
MNCs in solving labour problems. Relatively generous policies could also be 
introduced in the context of other income-generating growth models, such as 
those reliant on commodity exports. This meant greater variation between 
countries and between firms within countries. 
The main predictor of the generosity of welfare institutions, and their actual 
existence, was the strength of welfare constituencies within the respective 
political systems (Myant and Drahokoupil 2010, Chapter 10). Existence of 
welfare institutions was also conditioned upon state capacity to implement 
social policies, maintain administrative control over welfare infrastructure, and 
its ability to raise revenue. Effective systems of social protection were thus 
introduced where the executive was effectively accountable to electoral con-
straints, as was the case in Eastern Europe, or where the social interests were 
represented in the political system, as was the case particularly in Slovenia. In 
authoritarian regimes, the outcomes were variable. One factor, as argued by 
Cook (2007), may be the strength of bureaucratic-statist welfare interests in 
relation to the presidential power. 
The experience from welfare-state transformation in the last two decades 
has shown that the political strength of welfare constituencies also conditions 
reactions to fiscal shocks and economic crisis. These shocks may lead to sig-
nificant welfare retrenchment in the short term, but the mid-to-long term impli-
cations of such shocks are likely to be conditioned by political rather than 
economic factors. Most notably, such was the experience in Hungary in the 
aftermath of the crisis in the mid 1990s (see, e.g., Inglot 2008, 277-294). In 
fact, political factors – rather than economic constraints – were responsible for 
the most dramatic welfare retrenchment, that undertaken in Slovakia (O’Dwyer 
and Kovalčík 2007; Fisher, Gould, and Haughton 2007). 
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Figure 1: Social and health related government outlays, % of GDP 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund (2007) Government Finance Statistics Yearbook. 
Figure 2: Total social expenditure on social protection in Eastern Europe, % of 
GDP 
 
Source: Eurostat, available at eurostat.ec.europa.eu. 
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Figure 1 and Figure 2 provide key indicators of welfare efforts. As would be 
expected, these were largely conditioned by the level of development (meas-
ured here as per capita GDP in purchasing power parity). Yet, even when con-
trolling for GDP levels, there is great variation reflecting policy choices. Rela-
tively high levels of spending in Ukraine and Hungary, for which comparable 
data were not available and can thus be found in Figure 2 only, reflect the elec-
toral importance of welfare constituencies that has shaped the nature of wel-
fare-state adjustments (cf. Mykhnenko 2009; Tóth 2009). This is reflected in 
high levels of pensions relative to average pay. Other countries above the trend 
line followed slightly different courses of development. Belarus sustained rela-
tively high spending levels, but institutional reforms to address new problems 
such as unemployment were lacking. Poland had the experience of high pen-
sion payments from the early 1990s, possibly to satisfy, and later defended by, 
a powerful labour lobby. Slovenia moved close to the ‘European’ social model 
with its higher levels of spending and provision. 
Countries below the trend line include Kazakhstan, a case of an authoritar-
ian regime that minimised scope for interest representation and in which deci-
sions could be made without much external scrutiny. The power of welfare 
constituencies to influence the government in Russia was also weak, but sus-
taining the existing levels of social provision became an important political 
issue in the 2000s; and governments seem to be determined not to allow de-
creases in social spending. The weakness of state capacity in these and other 
CIS countries meant that formal commitments to levels of provision need not 
be reflected in reality. 
It is therefore possible to characterise welfare regimes in former state social-
ist countries around three ideal types, each of which is in a process of evolution 
and influenced by conflicting pressures for change3. For Eastern European 
states, the classification broadly corresponds to the three types of capitalism in 
Bohle and Greskovits (2007). However, we prefer a less encompassing per-
spective with more variation within country groups. 
The first is the ‘informalized’ model. The state does not provide the social 
protection that the population implicitly demands. It may have legal obligations 
to do so, but fails to honour them. Improvised solutions are then found by en-
terprises and individuals, who make informal payments for what may formally 
be publicly-provided services. Russia has roughly fit this ideal type and its 
evolution has been towards a system of low formal provision coupled with a 
formalised need to pay for much of welfare provision (cf. Davidova and Man-
ning 2009). Enterprises remained major providers of social services, including 
health care and housing: in 2008, there were still 460 mono-industrial, one-
company towns with a total population of 25 million (Malle 2009, 259). Remit-
                                                             
3  For detailed discussion, see (Myant and Drahokoupil 2010 Chapter 10). 
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tances constituted an important source of income particularly in low income 
CIS countries. Some of the countries approximating the ‘informalized’ model 
recorded relatively high social spending (e.g. Ukraine and Moldova), but this 
went to pension and public sector wages, squeezing spending on services. Out-
of-pocket payments, both formal and informal, thus constitute a major source 
of financing for health care (Shishkin et al. 2003; Lewis 2000). 
The second is the ‘minimal welfare state’ model, in which there is greater 
formal dependence on private provision and payment for services than is usual 
in western Europe. The state and its welfare institutions went through adjust-
ments. Therefore, unlike in the informalized model, the state fulfils its formal 
obligations and ensures that a private sector can supplement its activities to 
provide what is considered an adequate level of provision. This roughly corre-
sponds to countries that underwent gradual welfare-state adjustments with low 
levels of overall provision, including the Baltic States and South-Eastern 
Europe. The ‘minimal welfare state’ also corresponds to Slovakia, which un-
derwent neoliberal restructuring after 2002. 
Opposition to retrenchment was relatively strong there, as this is a country 
with significant interest representation; and other Central European countries 
have not as yet followed the same route. Further development could be either 
towards the ‘European’ social model or could continue along the current route. 
The third is the ‘European’ social model, as advocated especially by the so-
cial-democrat oriented political forces in Central Europe. The nearest example 
is Slovenia with considerable applicability in other Central European states. 
However, it is clearly under threat, with pressures for reductions in tax levels 
and welfare provision. Corporatist, status maintaining, social insurance consti-
tuted the underlying principles of core welfare institutions in such welfare 
states. In many cases, social insurance programmes provided universal cover-
age, with the contributions for those from outside of the labour force paid from 
the state budget. 
However, a large part of welfare arrangements in Eastern Europe is residual 
in its effects (Aidukaite 2006; Sirovátka and Saxonberg 2008; Keune 2009). 
Low ceilings make earnings-related benefits effectively flat and unattractive for 
middle classes. 
At the same time, social transfers had an important redistributive role in the 
Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Hungary. Thus, with considerable variation, 
these states combine elements of different welfare-state models known from 
the West (cf. Esping-Andersen 1990), but the level of social spending is much 
lower, making much of the provision residual.  
Varieties 3: Vulnerabilities and the crisis 
The variety of developmental models and the differences in public spending 
was associated with a variety of vulnerabilities, making some countries better 
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prepared to cope with the crisis than others. In general, countries were with 
financialized growth, where private sector borrowing fuels domestic consump-
tion and asset price bubbles were most vulnerable, but there was a large scope 
of variation, depending on the specific policies pursued. Public sector borrow-
ing played a marginal role in the majority cases, but it represented a very im-
portant factor in Hungary. Low domestic savings pools and interest rate differ-
entials encouraged borrowing abroad, creating debt refinancing risks. The 
dependence on capital imports was linked to foreign-currency indebtedness and 
fixed exchange rate arrangements, which represented important constraints for 
adjustment to economic shocks. The highest degree of currency substitution 
was also important in other growth models with high interest rate differentials 
and poor regulation of finance. 
The structure of vulnerabilities depended on the balance-sheet situation of 
the main economic actors, in particular on the maturity, capital, and currency 
structure of their assets and liabilities (Roubini and Setser 2004; Connolly 
2009)4. Aggregate balance sheet data are presented in Tables 3-6. The actual 
vulnerabilities as distributed among main actors were revealed as the crisis hit 
the region. The complexity of its effects can be analyzed along a four-stage 
framework. The first stage was the ‘credit crunch’, the crisis in banks caused 
by unsound lending to households. The second stage, the ‘demand slump’, was 
an extension of financial crisis into reduced demand for products that were 
dependent on credit, especially purchase of housing, construction, motor vehi-
cles and other consumer durables. The third stage consists of the adjustments to 
the new economic environment and patterns of international capital flows. This 
is much more varied in form. The fourth stage, the ‘solvency crisis’, could hit 
when governments, having run deficits during economic depression and ward-
ing off the effects of the preceding stages, are no longer able to borrow to cover 
those deficits, or at least when the cost of borrowing presents them with a ma-
jor problem. In some countries the stages are easily separable and follow in 
sequence. In others the separation is less clear. 
Stage 1: The credit crunch 
The credit crisis hit countries where the private sector actors and/or govern-
ments needed to raise capital to refinance their debt. The drying up of global 
liquidity led to major problems in the financialized regimes where persistent 
current account deficits were financed by foreign credits. In such a context, the 
                                                             
4  Capital structure mismatch refers to structural vulnerabilities resulting from excessive 
dependence on debt financing rather than equity. Currency mismatches occur if the curren-
cies in which debts are denominated differ from the currency of assets held or revenues 
earned by different sectors within the economy. Maturity mismatch arises if short term li-
abilities are not covered by reserves or revenues (short-term assets), putting the country into 
a solvency risk in the case of financial crisis. 
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drop in financial inflows translated into a contraction of domestic consumer 
demand and a collapse of real-estate prices and thus the construction sector. 
GDP in the financialized economies was therefore already falling in the last 
quarter of 2008. As shown in Table 7, the greatest output contractions were 
initially experienced in Latvia, Ukraine, and Estonia. What is more, refinancing 
problems led a number of countries to seek emergency financing from the IMF 
and, in the CIS context, from Russia.  
This gave the IMF significant power through its conditionalities (discussed 
below) and gave Russia geopolitical leverage. 
The credit crunch led to a capital flight from the region, triggering devalua-
tions in countries pursuing floating exchange-rate arrangements. Among those 
hit the most, the national currency lost between October 2008 and March 2009 
about 50 percent of its value in Ukraine, 30 percent in Poland, 25 percent in 
Russia, and more that 20 percent in Hungary. This was particularly painful in 
countries with high shares of foreign currency loans (see Table 6). This also 
increased difficulties in debt refinancing there. Cumulative losses to non-bank 
enterprises, households, and the government from devaluation between October 
2008 and March 2009 amounted to 18 percent of GDP in Hungary and 8 per-
cent in Poland (Auer and Wehrmüller 2009). Slovakia and Slovenia had 
adopted Euro and were protected from devaluation shocks, but suffered from 
the decrease of cost-competitiveness due to the significant appreciation relative 
to their competitors in Eastern Europe. 
There was a chance element that provoked crisis within countries in the in-
ability to repay debts at a particular time. The pattern of debt maturities could 
mean that it could hit a country with a relatively low debt level, as was the case 
in Belarus. 
Table 4 provides an overview of the maturity imbalances and thus helps to 
identify countries with refinancing needs. These are aggregate figures and the 
actual problems reflected the balance sheet situations of individual actors rather 
than economies as a whole. What is more, the currency structure of assets and 
liabilities also played an important role. 
A more complete picture can thus be obtained through a comparison with 
the levels of indebtedness of individual sectors (Table 3), the extent of foreign 
currency loans (Table 6), and external indebtedness (Table 5). Solvency prob-
lems in Ukraine, Hungary, and Latvia forced these countries to seek help 
within the IMF’s Stand-By Arrangement in late 2008. Russia appeared to be in 
a very sound position, given the size of its state reserves accumulated during 
the oil boom. The Russian state could thus act as a source of emergency financ-
ing for other CIS states. The credit crunch, however, represented a major prob-
lem for the private sector that relied extensively on foreign financing. As indi-
cated, in Table 3, the level of indebtedness of the Russian private sector was 
not high in relative terms, but refinancing of its short-term liabilities repre-
sented a major problem, as the prices of shares often used as collateral plum-
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meted in the context of the falling price of oil (Malle 2009, 258). State reserves 
could thus be used to solve the liquidity problems in the private sector, leading 
to further subordination of the private sector to the state.  
Table 4: Solvency risks and maturity structures  
 
External 
debt/exports, 
% 
FX-reserves-
to-ext debt 
S-t-to-FX-
reserves, % 
Debt refinanc-
ing needs, 
% of reserves 
 2008 2000 2008 o. mat r. mat 2009 
Poland  133.9 0.38 0.27 84 124 141 
Czech Republic   0.6 0.42 88 113 89 
Slovakia  67.0 0.37 0.34 111 137  
Hungary  138.7 0.36 0.19 99 177 101 
Slovenia  147.6 0.26 -    
Lithuania  113.5 0.27 0.21 111 159 204 
Estonia  151.7 0.31 0.17 284 358 346 
Latvia  298.0 0.18 0.16 246 312 331 
Croatia  214.5 0.3 0.28 40 87 136 
Bulgaria  168.8 0.27 0.44 89 112 132 
Romania 136.1 0.22 0.35 63 89 127 
Serbia 204.9      
Albania 73.9      
Montenegro 29.7      
Bosnia & Herzegovina 113.5      
FYR Macedonia 102.4      
Belarus  39.7 0.28 0.24 155 170 150+ 
Russia 118.5 0.15 0.86 18 29 34 
Ukraine  120.6 0.09 0.24 79 110 117 
Moldova 165.3 0.13 0.38    
Georgia 127.7 0.07 -    
Armenia ‘07 123.8 0.33 0.42    
Azerbaijan 20.2 0.64 0.67    
Kazakhstan 138.8 0.13 0.2 23 52 82 
Kyrgyzstan 73.7 0.13 -    
Tajikistan 274.6      
Uzbekistan 32.1      
Turkmenistan ‘06 10.7      
Source: IMF (2008b); Moody’s (2008); EBRD (2008), in Conolly 2009. 
S-t-to-FX-reserves: Raiffeisen Research and central banks. 
External Debt Refinancing Needs (IMF). 
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Table 5: External debt and its structure, %GDP 
 2008 2008.q3 
 total EBRD total gvmnt 
Total 
private banks 
Other 
sectors 
Poland  46.0 39.5 15.1 24.5 10.9 13.6 
Czech Republic   36.2 8.7 27.5 12.8 14.8 
Slovakia  53.3 42.7 11.5 31.2 18.9 12.3 
Hungary  113.5 87.4 32.6 54.8 38.1 16.7 
Slovenia  101.1 84 10 73.9 49.3 24.7 
Lithuania  68.7 65 9.9 55.2 37.2 17.9 
Estonia  115.7 94.7 2.9 91.9 64.3 27.6 
Latvia  124.2 118.3 6.2 112.1 84.9 27.2 
Croatia  82.7 77.4 17 60.5 19.6 40.9 
Bulgaria  103.5 71.4 8.3 63.1 27.1 36 
Romania 35.4      
Serbia 60.6      
Albania 20.4      
Montenegro 15.1      
Bosnia & Herzegovina 43.6      
FYR Macedonia 49.1      
Belarus  24.6 24 3.9 20.1 5.6 14.5 
Russia 36.0 (2007) 31.6 2.1 29.5 12.5 17.1 
Ukraine  57.3 59.9 8.4 51.5 25.1 26.4 
Moldova 68.2      
Georgia 35.6      
Armenia ‘07 23.3      
Azerbaijan 13.8      
Kazakhstan 79.8      
Kyrgyzstan 45.7      
Tajikistan 43.5      
Uzbekistan 13.6      
Turkmenistan ‘06 7.7      
Source: OTP Bank Hungary, EBRD. 
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Table 7: Falls in exports and GDP contractions in 2008-2009 
 
Change in exports 
y-o-y* 
GDP 2009 
 
Exports as % 
of GDP in 
2008 
2009 
Q1 
2009 
Q2 
2008 
Q4 
2009 
Q1 
2009 
Q2 
Czech Republic 67.1 -19.0 -19.4 0 -4.4 -5.8 
Hungary 68.8 -16.0 -13.5 -2.5 -6.7 -7.5 
Poland 33.9 -2.4 -2.9 2.9 0.8 1.1 
Slovakia 75.8 -29.6 -27.0 2.4 -5.7 -5.4 
Slovenia 53.7 -22.4 -23.7 -0.8 -8.3 -9.3 
Estonia 53.5 -25.9 -27.8 -9.2 -15 -16.1 
Latvia 28.4 -25.7 -27.4 -10.3 -18 -18.7 
Lithuania 50.2 -24.9 -36.1 -2.2 -13.3 -20.2 
Bulgaria  -26.9 -33.4 3.5 -3.5 -4.9 
Romania 24.5 -7.4 -9.3 -6.6** -13** -8.2** 
Croatia  -13.4 -23.9    
Bosnia & Herze-
govina  -20.7 -26.3 12 -10.9 -9.9 
FYR Macedonia  -34.6 -33.2 -0.8** -10.8** -13.2** 
Montenegro  -22.5 -58.2  -15.9** -28** 
Serbia 21.6 -13.5 -9.9 2.8 -4.2 -4 
Albania  -13.5 -20.1    
Ukraine 37.5 -39.4 -51.5 -8 -20.3 -18 
Belarus 61.0 -48.9 -46.4    
Uzbekistan  6.1 -6.3 7.8 7.9 8.5 
Mongolia  -44.4     
Russia 28.1 -47.9 -46.3 1.2 -9.8 -10.9 
Azerbaijan 66.0 -50.4 -47.4 10.8 4.1 3.6 
Kazakhstan 53.0 -49.2 -52.5 0.8 -2.2  
Turkmenistan n/a      
Armenia 9.2 -47.3 -44.8    
Georgia 18.8 -53.1 16.4*** -2.5   
Kyrgyzstan 35.3 -9.8 -10.9    
Moldova 27.1 -17.8 -22.9    
Tajikistan 8.5 -48.3 -47.6    
*Changes in exports measured in local currencies in Eastern European countries and in USD 
in the CIS. This overestimates the decline in CIS as the USD appreciated by approximately 
20% related to ruble. 
** Industrial production. 
*** preliminary. 
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However, in general, countries in trouble were ones with long histories of 
accumulating international debt, meaning that they had failed to build an export 
potential to finance growth in domestic consumption, and with banking sys-
tems that consistently failed to match the growth in credits by a growth in de-
posits. In hindsight, figures showed weaknesses of the financialized develop-
ment very clearly, but were not taken seriously enough in the years before 2008 
to force changes in policies (despite warnings such as Becker and Weissen-
bacher 2007; Berglöf 2007). 
The Role of the IMF 
Solvency problems led a number of countries in the region to seek help from 
the IMF, with Georgia, Ukraine, Hungary, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Belarus, Serbia, 
Armenia, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Romania, Poland, and Bosnia and Herzegovina 
enrolling in some of IMF lending programmes between September 2008 and 
September 2009. In the EU member states and accession countries, the EU 
commission had an important role in shaping these programmes and in provid-
ing funding. IMF’s stand-by-arrangements, such as those implemented in tran-
sition economies in the 1990s, had been associated with one-size-fit-all condi-
tionalities placing emphasis on macroeconomic restriction, often enforcing cuts 
in public spending. The IMF, however, claimed to have changed its approach 
in the context of the global financial crisis, overhauling its general lending 
framework to become more flexible and tailoring loan terms to suit country 
needs as well as putting emphasis on social protection to protect the most vul-
nerable through the social safety net and streamlining loan conditions with 
more flexibility on fiscal policy and inflation (IMF 2009a, 2009b). The IMF 
became a strong supporter of government fiscal stimuli and expansionary 
monetary policies implemented in the EU and the US to counter-act the world 
recession (IMF 2008a). It also introduced a new lending instrument, the condi-
tionality-free and unphased Flexible Credit Line for ‘well-run emerging market 
economies’ (IMF 2009a, 1), which was extended to Poland. 
In the transition economies, the actual experience was more complicated. It 
may be possible to speak about a new approach to emergency lending in low-
income countries. In this context, agreements seemed to be indeed less biased 
to pro-cyclical policies, with agreements in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia 
including expansionary fiscal policies. What is more, improving the social 
safety net and defending or increasing social spending plays an important role 
in such agreements.  
These were the ‘informalized welfare models’, which had failed to adjust their 
welfare-states. IMF and WB intervention thus may play an important role in 
pushing for making social policy matter. 
The IMF agreements in East European countries, nevertheless, did not show 
signs of a major change in IMF’s approach, with conditionalities putting em-
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phasis on fiscal and monetary restriction (cf. IMF 2009c; Weisbrot et al. 2009). 
Ukraine, for instance, agreed that the budget deficit, excluding bank recapitali-
zation costs, would not exceed 1 percent of GDP in 2008 and 0 percent in 
2009. Hungary vowed to reduce the public sector by 2.5 percent of GDP and 
introduce a rules-based fiscal framework. This was particularly harsh, as the 
government had undertaken budget cuts reducing deficit from 10 to 3 percent 
of GDP in the previous two years. As in Ukraine, cuts in spending took place in 
the context of pro-cyclical monetary tightening. In April 2009, signs of flexibil-
ity were observed with the IMF and the EU agreeing to lift the deficit target to 
3.9 percent of GDP. 
The implications of IMF conditionalities may be most profound in Belarus, 
as they put emphasis on important structural reforms, including price liberaliza-
tion, cutting price subsidies, and scaling down subsidies and direct lending for 
enterprises. As far as welfare policies are concerned, Belarus also did little to 
adjust them to the new environment, but it continued supporting old means of 
welfare provision such as utility and housing subsidies. IMF would like to see 
those policies scaled down and replaced by the targeted safety net. This may 
enforce some needed adjustments in social policies. At the same time, the con-
ditionalities require dismantling policies such as utility subsidies that consti-
tuted the core of the Belarussian welfare system. 
However, the role of the IMF should not be over-estimated. First, the IMF’s 
intervention was associated with other factors militating against anti-cyclical 
measures, such as higher initial debt levels. The IMF’s intervention thus did not 
necessarily lead to a more restrictive policy. At the same time, however, its 
funding did not provide leeway for counter-cyclical anti-crisis measures as 
would be preferred by some of the IMF’s critics (e.g. Weisbrot et al. 2009). 
Second, policy makers in countries as varied as Belarus, Latvia, and Serbia 
seemed to prefer restrictive policies for reasons other than the IMF’s condition-
alities. Finally, there is a question of the degree of enforceability as far as the 
IMF’s conditionalities are concerned. This is particularly relevant for the CIS 
countries where Russia seemed to be willing to provide alternative sources of 
financing. What is more, the IMF did not seem to be willing to go as far as to 
let countries default to enforce the conditionalities, particularly if that would 
imply a collapse of a government deemed allied to the West. The latter was the 
case of Yulia Tymoshenko government in Ukraine. Thus, in the context of the 
run up to February 2010 elections, the IMF continued to support the govern-
ment despite its clear failure to meet conditionalities on fiscal restriction in 
2009 and also in the 2010 budget. 
The interventions of the IMF and the WB had been previously associated 
with pressures for institutional reform of the welfare states with long-term 
impact, most notably pension-system reform (Orenstein, 2008). This time, the 
pressure for further privatization does not seem to be a priority. The stage 1 of 
the crisis had an immediate negative impact on privatized pension schemes. 
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Portfolios of mandatory private individual accounts that had been introduced 
through the WB-inspired reforms recorded substantial year-on-year losses: 30.5 
percent in Estonia (15 Oct 2008), 35 percent Hungary (15 Oct 2008), 48.4 
percent in Lithuania (15 Oct 2008), and 12.4 percent in Slovakia (15 Oct 2008) 
(WB 2008b). This did not provide a case for further reform, nor did it lead to a 
change in WB’s thinking (2008b). 
Stage 2: The demand slump 
The second stage refers to the impact of falling demand for physical goods 
following the first effects of the financial crisis. That impact was felt on domes-
tic demand for exports, hitting particularly countries with a high share of ex-
ports relative to GDP (see Table 7). This included some countries already suf-
fering from Stage 1, such as Hungary, Ukraine and the Baltic States, and some 
that appeared to have escaped without much effect, including Slovakia, and the 
Czech Republic. 
A division can be made into countries with exports based on manufacturing 
and light industry, largely Eastern Europe, and countries exporting semi-
manufactures and raw materials, including Russia and Ukraine. Falls in exports 
and GDP are indicated in Table 7. Eastern European countries recorded lower 
drops in exports than the natural-resources exporters in the CIS. The export 
falls among the manufacturing exporters reflected the drop in the volume of 
goods exported, which immediately translated into a collapse of industrial 
output and thus of GDP. In contrast, the falls in exports among the natural-
resources exporters led to a collapse in export prices rather than volumes. The 
impact on output (measured in constant prices as GDP) was thus less severe 
and immediate.  
Moreover, the initial drop in manufacturing demand in Eastern Europe was 
ameliorated by the expansionary policies pursued in Western Europe (and also 
in Slovakia). The German car scrap scheme, in operation until September 2009, 
was particularly important for export demand in the Czech Republic and Ro-
mania, which produced smaller and cheaper cars popular in this context. Po-
land’s GDP was the least dependent on exports and also the least dependent on 
exports from the motor-vehicle industry. Slovakia appeared the most vulner-
able should this sector suffer. 
The second stage is less clearly differentiated. Drops in output shown in Ta-
ble 7 were also related to the collapse in financialized growths, which span the 
usual groupings of transition economies. Russia was hit by the sharp fall in 
commodity prices, but that tied in more closely with the financial effects cov-
ered under the third stage. The reason for this difference was that key enter-
prises were under domestic rather than foreign ownership. This gave them a 
financial independence that was absent for the big firms, or rather subsidiaries 
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of MNCs, in CEECs. At the same time, Russian firms had to raise finance in 
ways that carried risks for the domestic economy. 
Stage 3: Adjustments to the new environment 
The third stage brought some further threats that operated through interna-
tional, as well as internal, economic processes. The new international economic 
environment implied adjustments in national economic structures and, most 
notably, in the ways of achieving external balance. The collapse of import 
demand based on external borrowing resolved the current account problems of 
financialized economies. In contrast, current account started to be an issue 
among the natural-resource exporters, which have seen their export earnings 
reduced by the collapse of prices. 
There are also further dangers to countries that had been dependent on fi-
nancial inflows and that had a significant share of credits in foreign currencies. 
The drop in real-estate prices put a strain on balance sheets of the private sec-
tor, with the increase in the stock of non-performing loans undermining the 
banking system. Any currency devaluation then threatens the ability of debtors 
to repay, in turn threatening the stability of creditor institutions. This provides 
incentives to the governments to defend the exchange rate through pro-cyclical 
policies rather than to compensate for the falls in the level of economic output 
through expansionary policies. 
The adjustment was thus particularly socially costly in the Baltic States, 
which attempted to defend their fixed exchange rate arrangements through 
public spending and wages cuts. In June 2009 Latvia, the worst hit, imple-
mented €712m in spending cuts and tax increases, designed to reduce the 
budget deficit by 10 percent of GDP in the next three to four years. It cut wages 
in the public sector by almost 40 percent and reduced pensions by 10 percent. It 
also reduced benefits and increased payments in health care. The Baltic States 
seemed to reach a dead end in their growth strategies as the speculative boom is 
not likely to be repeated in the region in the foreseeable future. 
The third stage had only a gradual impact in CEECs. Domestic demand lev-
els fell as external finance was reduced and as output – and hence wages and 
employment – were reduced in export-oriented activities. However, that did not 
lead to further financial difficulties, for example due to failure to repay loans to 
banks. 
Some banks have seen their credit ratings downgraded, reflecting the diffi-
culties for their customers in the context of collapsing demand. Foreign-owned 
banks in CEECs were perceived as prudent as they did not buy into subprime 
markets.  
However, in countries with low deposit bases (see Table 4), concerns were 
raised about the lack of liquidity and capital. Moreover, the scarcity of capital 
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provided mother-banks incentives to withdraw funds from the region (EC 
2009, 22). 
Following intensive lobbying by banks with exposure to CEECs markets, 
the Joint IFI Action Plan for Central & Eastern Europe (including the EBRD, 
the EIB Group, and the World Bank) was launched in March 2009 to address 
these concerns. It pledged to provide up to €24.5 billion of support to the bank-
ing sectors in the region and to fund lending to businesses. Credits were re-
duced gradually, reflecting greater caution from banks; and difficulties with 
credits in foreign currency were generally overcome by increasing payments 
from debtors. The third stage therefore meant lower living standards for the 
population, lower tax revenues for the state and subsequent growing budget 
deficits, but no immediate further downturn. The effects on the trade balance 
remained unclear, as lower domestic demand cut imports while lower export 
demand cut exports, with no certainty as to which reduction would be the lar-
ger. 
An open question remains the fate and behaviour of MNCs, which might re-
think their strategies towards investment in CEECs. Reduction in inward in-
vestment, and more dramatically decisions to pull out, would lead to lower 
employment and domestic incomes as well as lower export levels and lower 
levels of financial inflow, which had helped to balance out current account 
deficits. Multinational companies could become a net drain as repatriated prof-
its dominate over capital inflows and benefits from net export earnings. All of 
this is possible, but it is also possible that MNCs would see CEECs among 
their most desirable locations, as they continually offer cheaper labour than in 
western Europe. The first quarter of 2009, however, recorded a drop of one-
third in new FDI projects in most of East-European countries5. 
A heavy blow was also felt in countries dependent on remittances when 
production, and hence demand for labour, fell in the countries where those 
people had previously worked. The countries most dependent on remittances, 
set out in Table 1, included a number of smaller CIS countries and Albania. 
They can be expected to suffer very severe falls in income levels. Based on the 
experience of the 1998 Russian Crisis, O’Hara, Ivlevs, and Gentile (2009) 
suggested that by 2012, remittances to the region could fall to only one-third 
the 2008 level, and that a return to pre-crisis levels of remittances could take 
almost a decade. 
Stage 4: The solvency crisis 
The fourth stage, the crisis in state budgets as a result of the effects of the 
world financial crisis, remained a permanent threat limiting governments’ 
scope for active intervention. The region started from a good position in terms 
                                                             
5  Country reports at fdimarkets.com (accessed 1 June 2009). 
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of its public indebtedness. However, in the aftermath of the crisis, the transition 
economies have seen their revenues fall faster than the rate of GDP contraction, 
with the difference being attributed to the falls in imports, the declining asset 
base, weak compliance, and – in some cases – tax reductions. This led to 
budget deficit increases and put public spending cuts on the agendas. What is 
more, the crisis of financialized growth led to an increase in public borrowing 
to recapitalize banks and underwrite subprime loans. State default became an 
immediate threat in Latvia, which was dependent on EU and IMF lending but 
struggled to fulfil their conditionalities. 
Conclusion: Immediate impacts, long term prospects 
The 2008 financial meltdown triggered a crisis of the capitalist varieties that 
relied primarily on the financialized growth. In such contexts, the challenge is 
to restructure economies around the productive sectors. Financialization was 
associated with foreign-currency indebtedness and fixed exchange rate ar-
rangements. This created important policy incentives to defend the value of 
currency rather that output and employment, channeling adjustments through 
public spending and wage cuts. The level of financialization was highest in the 
Baltic States. There, the potential of productive sectors in these countries is 
very weak. With policy options limited by economic and political constraints, 
the risk of social and economic disintegration along with continuing depopula-
tion is thus high. These states face a profound political crisis, potentially un-
dermining political arrangements underpinning their ‘minimalist’ welfare 
states. The search for an alternative may thus also involve transformation of 
their welfare model. The rescue package in Latvia included not only massive 
spending cuts in the defence of the present economic model, but also scrapping 
of the flat tax, the symbol of the Baltic model.  
The global meltdown was a crisis in (rather than a crisis of) the developmen-
tal models based on natural-resource exports, with contractions reflecting de-
cline in values rather than that of the actual output. Moreover, high reserves 
allowed the Russian state to conduct counter-cyclical policies and bail out the 
private sector companies facing insolvency. Crisis led to a significant fall in 
incomes also in the remittance – and aid-dependent economies. However, in 
some low-income countries IMF assistance may lead to an improvement in 
their ‘informalized’ welfare models. 
The prospects in the countries dependent on foreign direct investment and 
exports into Western markets remain an open question. Downward adjustments 
in global FDI flows and import demand may lead to a crisis of this model, with 
FDI becoming a net drain on the current account rather than the primary source 
of its financing. But the ‘crisis in scenario’ is also possible: the region can 
become a desirable low-labour-cost location in the context of the productive 
capacity restructuring pending in Europe. The capacity of these countries to 
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sustain their levels of social spending in the post-2008 adjustments remains to 
be seen. It can be expected that there will be strong political pressures in these 
countries to sustain (or go back to) higher levels of provision in the future. The 
feasibility of such adjustments, however, will be conditional upon early eco-
nomic recovery. 
Ultimately, indeed, the prospects of the region depend on the developments 
in the world economy. The IMF predictions point to a relatively limited period 
of economic decline but are accompanied by warnings that the area of uncer-
tainty is large as well as that there could be a more prolonged and severe de-
pression with more serious consequences for individual countries. A major 
reason for pessimism is the observation that previous financial crises in indi-
vidual countries have tended to be long lasting with recovery dependent on 
strong demand from outside, in other words from the rest of the world (IMF 
2009d; see also Reinhart and Rogoff 2008).  
Levels of credit have tended to recover very slowly. Experience in transition 
economies has been fully consistent with that, as credits relative to GDP al-
ways grew slowly, at least when based on domestic deposit bases, and recov-
ered only gradually from periodic crises. The implication in the context of a 
world downturn is that, as demand fell in almost all parts of the world, recovery 
based on financial and credit systems would be very gradual. Indeed, the com-
plexity of the effects of the initial financial difficulties points to a strengthening 
of forces leading towards deeper depression rather than to an awakening of 
forces for recovery. 
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